Civil-Military Working Paper 12/2010: Realising the “Imagined armies of expert civilians” – A summary of national civilian capacity arrangements for conflict management

Introduction

The title of this paper reflects the increasing normative focus on the need for rapidly deployable civilian expertise to support countries in the immediate aftermath of conflict (UNGA/SC 2009, p. 1).² This focus stems from the changing nature of armed conflict and an enhanced understanding of the priorities and needs of countries ravaged by violent conflict.

The predominance and complexity of intrastate conflict creates huge demands for capacity support to meet the urgent needs of the conflict-affected community. These urgent needs generally include: basic safety and security (including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), and the re-establishment of the rule of law); re-establishment of core government institutions and functions; transitional justice; reconciliation; the provision of basic services; and economic revitalisation (UNSC ‘Statement’ 2008, p. 1; UNGA/SC 2009, p. 6). Civilian expertise, alongside a military security contribution, is critical to help conflict-affected communities meet these priority needs (UNSC ‘Statement’ 2008, p. 1). The speed with which this expertise is deployed is a fundamental issue, as the first two years after a conflict ends represent a critical ‘window of opportunity’ for delivering peace dividends and building confidence in the peace process, thus beginning to ‘lay the foundations for sustainable development’ (UNGA/SC 2009, p. 1).

The predominance and complexity of intrastate conflict has led to a ‘civilianization’ of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mandates and demanded the evolution of UN peacekeeping from predominantly military missions to multidimensional peacebuilding missions comprising military and civilian elements, including police. With this trend toward increasingly multidimensional operations, civilians have shifted from peripheral support roles to the ‘core of contemporary peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions’ (de Coning 2010, p. 1). Today, out of approximately 124,000 personnel serving in 16 UN peacekeeping operations, roughly 22,000 are civilians, representing 20% of all UN peacekeepers (de Coning 2010, p. 1). This number increases to approximately 25,000 civilians when one expands the purview to include the missions of the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union (AU) and other international organisations (Center for International Peace Operations 2010).

This trend toward increasing civilianisation is also visible in environments of irregular warfare such as Afghanistan, where a much higher ‘premium’ is being placed on civil and political expertise, in addition to traditional military skills (Cronin 2008, p. 5). The International Security Assistance Force has developed an explicit strategy to enhance civilian engagement in Afghanistan. Aligned with this strategy, in April 2010, the Australian Government announced a 50% increase in its civilian contribution to Afghanistan (Department of Defence 2010, p. 7).

Despite this trend, the total number of civilian personnel in peace and stabilisation missions is not as high as it ought to be, due to significant civilian vacancy rates. According to estimates from the UN Department for Field Support (DFS), for example, start-up UN peacekeeping missions have a vacancy rate of 53% (Chandran et al. 2009, p. 7).

Civilian vacancy rates and the pervasively slow pace of civilian deployment is currently receiving significant attention and is a major source of concern for governments and multilateral organisations alike. In fact, this gap has been a persistent problem for many years. The Secretary-General’s first report on protection of civilians (POC) in 1999 recommended that the Security Council ‘take steps to strengthen the Organization’s capacity to plan and deploy rapidly…’ with specific reference to ‘increasing the numbers of civilian police and specialized civil administration and humanitarian personnel…’ (UNSC 1999, p. 18). In 2000, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the ‘Brahimi Report’) highlighted the UN Secretariat’s inability to ‘identify, recruit and deploy suitably qualified civilian personnel in substantive and support functions’ (UNGA/SC 2000, p. 21) and called for proposals for the establishment of a ‘Civilian Standby Arrangements System’ (UNGA/SC 2000, p. 25). In the 2005 World Summit Outcome, Heads of State and Government urged for ‘further development of proposals for enhanced, rapidly deployable capacities to reinforce peacekeeping operations in crises’ (UNGA 2005, p. 23).

More recently, in 2008, the United Kingdom (UK) hosted an open debate in the UN Security Council on post-conflict stabilisation, intended to identify and address the ‘critical gaps that hamper international efforts to help countries stabilise and build sustainable peace as they emerge from conflict’ (UNSC ‘Letter’ 2008, p. 2). In the concept paper circulated prior to the debate, the Permanent Representative of the UK identified three critical gaps, one of which was ‘rapidly deployable and skilled civilian capacity’ (UNSC ‘Letter’ 2008, p. 3). Building on a background study commissioned for the open debate, the New York University Center on International Cooperation (CIC) identified a ‘broad lack of rapidly deployable capacity’ for ‘leadership, planning and coordination, and capacity for execution’(Chandran et al. 2009, p. 2). A similar observation was noted in the non-paper ‘New Horizon’ by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and DFS, which identified civilian specialists as a critical shortage for 2009 (UNDPKO/DFS 2009, p. 27). Civilian deployment capabilities received significant attention again in the UN Secretary- General’s 2009 report on peacebuilding, which addressed the challenges for countries and the international community in the immediate aftermath of conflict (UNGA/SC 2009). A significant outcome of the report was the establishment of the UN Review of International Civilian Capacities in March 2010, which has been mandated to ‘improve the international response in the aftermath of conflict by strengthening the availability, deployability and appropriateness of civilian capacities for peacebuilding’ (UNGA 2010).³

Diversity of arrangements

Deployable civilian capacity arrangements can be found among Member States, regional and subregional organisations, within the UN,⁴ and among civil society organisations.⁵ Some arrangements are also administered through partnerships or other affiliations between governments and non-governmental organisations or private sector bodies (see Box 1 for some examples). These arrangements generally comprise elements of standing, standby, and/or reserve/rostered components. Though there are varying definitions of this terminology, which can create some confusion (Chandran et al. 2009, p. 7), the broad categories of capacity can be differentiated as follows (UNGA/SC 2009, p. 19; de Coning 2010, p. 3; Chandran et al. 2009, p. 7).

• Standing Capacity: This arrangement provides the most reliable, timely capacity for rapid deployment as it comprises personnel who are prepared to rapidly deploy, as part of their conditions of service.
• Standby Capacity: This arrangement comprises a pool of personnel who are pre-identified and pre-vetted for rapid deployment when needed.
• Reserve/Rostered Capacity: This arrangement comprises a database of personnel who can be approached for deployment, following assessment of their suitability (de Coning 2010, p. 3).

According to a 2010 report by the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), ‘the effectiveness of response will be a function of the three factors of predictability, timeliness and reliability – will anybody come (predictability), when will they come (timeliness), and do they have the right skills, experience and training (reliability)’(Morris 2010, p. 34).

Existing National Arrangements

Deployable civilian capacity arrangements are found predominantly among a small number of western countries, notably Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the USA.⁶ Among some countries, these arrangements have assumed a central role in their government’s national identity and international engagement. Norway, for example, considers the deployment of civilian experts as “central to Norway’s foreign policy interests’ (de Coning et al. 2010, p. 10). Elsewhere, such as in the Asia-Pacific region, arrangements that do exist are primarily ad hoc in nature.

Governmental arrangements vary considerably in their scope and structure. Some arrangements are centralised and whole-of-government efforts, some are decentralised and housed within discrete ministries, and some might be called ‘whole-of-nation’, as they draw on government personnel and/or the wider national community.

Rosters are the most common form of arrangement. The Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM), established in 1993, is one of the first national rosters to have been established by a ministry of foreign affairs (Chandran et al. Annex A 2009, p. 10). Since then, Norway has established various additional rosters, including a Rule of Law Pool, the CIVPOL Pool, and the Defence Security Sector Reform Pool (de Coning et al. 2010, p. 11). Interestingly, the CISAC report argues that many of the existing civilian rosters are ‘more of a recruitment tool than a rapid deployment tool’ (Morris 2010, p. 25).

Standby capacity arrangements are another common structure, one example being Canada’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Taskforce (START). START chairs an international, multilateral standby facility, Justice Rapid Response (JRR), for which the JRRs thirty-eight member states and twenty member organisations nominate personnel. This facility trains and deploys ‘active duty criminal justice and related professionals’ for investigations, fact-finding missions, and assessment missions, among other operations (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada 2010). Another example of a standby arrangement is the UK’s Civilian Stabilisation Group (CSG), which includes a Civil Service Stabilisation Cadre that draws upon currently employed civil servants and local government employees, all of whom are available for short-notice short-term and longer-term deployments (UKaid 2010).

To-date, there are few genuine standing capacity arrangements. Two noteworthy examples are the Australian Federal Police (AFP) International Deployment Group (IDG), and the US Civilian Response Corps (CRC) Active Component. The IDG comprises a standing corps of AFP officers who are able to deploy as first responders in situations of instability to engage in remote patrols, protection, and civil disorder, among other tasks (AFP 2010). To facilitate this standby capacity, the IDG established an Operational Response Group (ORG), which provides a ‘ready response, highly-skilled tactical policing capability for rapid deployment to unstable domestic and international operational situations’ using stability response teams and tactical response teams (AFP 2010). Similarly, the US CRC Active Component comprises full-time government employees whose job is to train for, and deploy as first responders within 48 hours, to situations of stabilisation, reconstruction and conflict prevention (US Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 2010).

There are no existing national arrangements that contain all three capacities: standing, standby and reserve. The US CRC currently has a standing component and a standby component, and has plans for a reserve component, though this has not yet been authorized or funded by Congress (Herbst 2010).

National arrangements also vary in their personnel make-up. Some arrangements draw personnel exclusively from government departments and agencies, such as the US CRC (though the planned Reserve Component would include non-government US citizens). Some arrangements comprise both government and non-government personnel, such as the UK CSG, which draws upon civil-servants and local government employees and non-civil servants, including former UN staff and retired military personnel. And, some arrangements, such as Germany’s Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF), draw upon the wider German community.

The existing national arrangements also differ in the sectors of expertise they prioritise. It is worth nothing that, although this paper is focused on civilian support to conflict and post-conflict situations, some of these arrangements also enable civilian support to disaster response operations; Australia and Canada are two examples. The German and UK arrangements maintain expertise across a wide range of issue areas, from elections to media development, from livelihoods to strategic communications. In contrast, most other arrangements appear to focus on a discrete number of areas of expertise. The Australian Civilian Corps (ACC), for example, has identified six priority fields of expertise, including security, justice and reconciliation, and economic stability (AusAID 2010). Unsurprisingly, rule of law and the security sector are among the sectors most often prioritized in these national arrangements.

Issues and challenges

There has been considerable activity over the past decade in the development of rapidly deployable civilian capacity arrangements. Recent analysis of these arrangements highlights a number of issues of concern and identifies various challenges that require particular attention.

Multitude of Arrangements – ‘Irrational’⁷ and ‘Incompatible’⁸

The multitude of national arrangements, while on the surface a positive development, is problematic. To-date, the majority of these arrangements appear to have been developed in isolation from one another. CIC has done considerable analysis in this area and has identified a number of major weaknesses and gaps: there is no shared assessment of the capacity needs, or common strategic and operational frameworks; and there is limited awareness among, and communication and coordination between, these arrangements, which has led to a high-level of duplication (Chandran et al. 2009, p. 3). Significantly, many of these arrangements also appear to have ‘ineffective linkages to the multilateral institutions that lead most responses’ (Chandran et al. 2009, 4).

The Challenges of ‘Whole-of-Government’

National arrangements within a whole-of-government framework can face particular coordination challenges given their multi-agency structure. The multi-agency structure of the UK CSG, for example, a joint office of the Department for International Development, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Ministry of Defence, has proved problematic. It has been noted by outside observers that this multi-agency is an ‘orphan with three parents’ (Wiharta and Blair 2010, p. 100-1), and lacking ‘a single champion that is invested in its success and that has the power to promote its mission and force coordination among reluctant bureaucrats’ (Bensahel 2008, p. 3). No doubt as these issues are identified, solutions will be developed.

National Ownership and Capacity Development

While there is no denying the need for international civilian capacity in the immediate aftermath of conflict, this capacity must be carefully considered and planned to avoid undermining the development of the host country’s national capacities. Yet, although all external, international efforts ought to be guided by this imperative of national ownership, there has been a significant lack of dedicated focus and action in this area, except in the ‘context of international exit strategies from post-conflict countries’ (UNGA/SC 2009, p. 7). According to the 2009 Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, ‘There is a tendency to assume that capacity has been completely depleted, rather than finding existing capacity and strengthening it’ (UNGA/SC 2009, p. 15). This inattention and inaction is also visible on the question of building capacity in the global South, with CIC observing a ‘near total lack of investment in serious efforts to build middle-income and developing country capacity’(Chandran et al. 2009, p. 4).

Awareness of Existing International Capacities

As with national capacity, any international civilian capacity response ought to be aware of other international capacities already on the ground, draw on these capacities, and, where possible, reinforce (UNGA/SC 2009, p. 18) rather than duplicate them. However, this dynamic and interaction is difficult to achieve given the multitude of international actors that co-exist in a conflict or post-conflict environment, and the lack of clarity regarding their roles and responsibilities. This confusion is noted by CIC in their observation – ‘the current UN architecture for post-conflict response is flawed: and these flaws contribute to the messy reality that is the civilian response to conflict’ (Chandran et al. 2009, p. 13). The recent establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office is intended to provide a much-needed centralized UN focal point for peacebuilding, though their roles are still evolving (Chandran et al. 2009, p. 13).

Expertise Required

Civilians are required for a multitude of functions in a post-conflict environment. The ability to locate appropriately skilled personnel to fill the more complex, nuanced positions remains a challenge. The CIC, for example, has observed that ‘…numerous western member states have actively solicited the names of judges for their civilian capacity rosters. There is little evidence, however, from our research, that retired Western judges are in high demand, or of high utility in (for example) Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone or Timor-Leste…’ (Chandran et al. 2009, p. 4). Particularly challenging are those roles that require political understanding and expertise, such as functions relating to ministry reform, where there is currently a
dearth of expertise.

Looking ahead

The field of rapidly deployable civilian capacity is in ‘flux’ (Chandran et al. 2009, p. 3); new arrangements are being developed and considered; initiatives are underway to improve existing systems and arrangements; and proposals are being put forward for new systems and arrangements. These include:

New Arrangements in Development

• The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) launched the ACC in 2009 to enable ‘the rapid deployment of trained civilian specialists to countries experiencing or emerging from natural disasters or conflict’ (AusAID). The ACC is planned to be operational by 2011, will draw upon government and non-government personnel, and will be managed by AusAID in coordination with the Australian Defence Force and the AFP.
• The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) established the Norwegian Standby Capacity Programme (NORCAP) in 2009 to oversee the multiple civilian rosters that exist to support the UN and other international organisations. Since then, a new specialised civilian standby roster has been established, the Norwegian Standby Roster for Civilian Observers (NOROBS), to support the deployment of civilian experts to peace and reconciliation missions. In January 2010, the NRC commissioned a scoping study for the establishment of NOROBS (de Coning et al. 2010, p. 16).
• The German Federal Agency for Technical Relief is currently exploring the possibility to establish a 30-member Standing Engineering Capacity to facilitate rapid deployment of units to UN missions (Chandran et al. Annex A 2009, p. 9).
• The EU is in the midst of reform and reorganisation that is affecting its civilian crisis management efforts. The EU’s Civilian Headline Goal process, which maps its civilian crisis management tasks, is also undergoing review and revision (Wiharta and Blair 2010, p. 96).
• The AU is developing a Rapid Deployment Capability as part of the African Standby Force to provide a stabilization force to respond to genocide, to provide assistance to peacekeeping missions, and to provide an early intervention presence (Chandran et al. Annex A 2009, p. 2).
• There is analysis underway within the South Pacific regarding the establishment of a regional rapid reaction mechanism to respond to situations of crisis in the Pacific, although this is at an early stage.⁹

Support to Existing Systems and Approaches

• A number of recent efforts have begun to focus on strengthening the interoperability among national civilian capacity arrangements. The ACC and US S/CRS have signed a memorandum of understanding to enhance collaboration between the two organisations. The International Stabilization and Peacebuilding Initiative (ISPI) was launched to strengthen civilian capability and interoperability among international actors, following the Washington Workshop on Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Peacebuilding (October 2009) (US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 2010, p. 1). Though ISPI is still in its infancy as an initiative, it is expected that it will include an international working group, a community of practice, a web platform and email listservs, among other elements. Also, Germany’s ZIF is currently leading a project ‘Promoting Civilian Capacity for International Peace Operations‘(CIVCAP) to ‘build and improve civilian capacity for peacekeeping, peacebuilding and civilian crisis management’ (Center for International Peace Operations 2010). The project includes an online portal facilitating information-sharing and support to practitioners involved in the human resources aspect of civilian deployment, including recruitment, training, deployment, and management of personnel.
• The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is currently carrying out a research project on ‘The Civilian Contribution to Peace Operations: Assessing Progress and Addressing Gaps’. The project is intended to ‘support policy development and other initiatives that will strengthen national, regional and international capacities to enhance civilian contributions to peace operations’ (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2010). Workshops have already been held for this project in Africa and Europe, and most recently in the Asia-Pacific region.
• As mentioned earlier, a UN-appointed Senior Advisory Group is currently conducting a Review of International Civilian Capacities, assisted by the UN Peacebuilding Support Office. The Review process will include a series of consultations and events culminating in an International Symposium on Civilian Capacity.

Proposals for New Approaches

• In their 2009 report Rapid Deployment of Civilians for Peace Operations: Status, Gaps, and Options, the CIC proposes a three-tiered or phased system for rapid deployment, focusing on UN-led integrated peace operations. The three phases are: ‘start up’, to deploy Integrated Standing Early Recovery Teams to conduct sector-specific strategic assessment and planning; ‘ramp up’, to deploy Sector Specialist Teams; and lastly ‘staff up’ to deploy long-term full-time personnel.¹⁰ This system would be backed-up by a number of new institutional arrangements for sourcing rapidly deployable personnel, including a Rapid Response Civilian Corps, task-specific Centers of Capacity, and a ‘GlobalDem’, a global roster of rosters.
• In a Policy Brief by the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI), de Coning advocates for the establishment of a global civilian capacity partnership to facilitate improved linkages between the UN recruitment system, the international training and rostering community, and interested Member States (de Coning 2010, p. 3–4).
• CISAC proposes the establishment of a North/South partnership between a limited number of countries to provide enabling standby capacities for the UN in the areas of policing, the judiciary and corrections (Morris 2010, p. 39–40).
• The European Council on Foreign Relations has provided a strong critique of the EU’s current crisis management missions, describing them as mostly ‘small, lacking in ambition and strategically irrelevant’ (Korski and Gowan 2009, p. 11). They propose a new mission concept that focuses on ‘scalable assistance

partnerships’ and shifts responsibility away from diplomats in Brussels to civilians on the ground to ensure
speed, security and self-sufficiency (Korski and Gowan 2009, p. 15).

Conclusions

Peace and stabilisation missions have become increasingly civilianised over the past decade. In response, there has been considerable activity to develop rapidly deployable civilian capacity arrangements in support of missions deployed to conflict and post-conflict countries. Currently, these arrangements are predominantly national and found among a small number of western countries. Significant challenges exist, relating to the multiplicity of arrangements and the dearth of multilateral linkages, the delicate balance between providing needed international capacity and building host nation capacity, the inherent difficulties associated with multi-agency structures, and the interaction with international civilian capacities already on the ground. New arrangements are currently being developed and considered, including in the global South, initiatives are underway to improve existing arrangements, and proposals are being put forward for new arrangements.

Endnotes

1. ←Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi quoted in UNSC ‘5895th meeting’ 2008, p. 10.
2. ←The United Nations defines the immediate aftermath of conflict as the first two years after the end of the main conflict in a country.
3. ←On 7 March 2011, after the finalisation of this paper, the report of the Senior Advisory Group for the Review of International Civilian Capacities was released. The report is available at: http://www.civcapreview.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=SE-205TrKg0%3D&tabid=3188&language=en-US.
4. ←These include the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Rapid Response roster, the Department of Political Affairs’ Mediation Support Unit’s Standby team, the DPKO’s Standing Police Capacity (SPC), and the inter-agency UN Protection Standby Capacity Project (ProCAP) and Gender Standby Capacity Project (GenCAP).
5. ←Canada’s Civilian Reserve (CANADEM) and the African Civilian Response Capacity for Peace Support Operations (ADFEM) are two examples.
6. ←Annex A of Chandran et al. 2009 provides a detailed overview of existing national, multilateral and civil society civilian deployment capacities, 1–23.
7. ←Note, this term is also used to describe multilateral deployable teams (Chandran et al. 2009, p. 10).
8. ←The UK Government has gone so far as to describe these arrangements as ‘at times incompatible’ (UNSC ‘Letter’ 2008, p. 3).
9. ←This information is from: ‘Specific Terms of Reference: Support Study on options to establish a Regional Rapid Reaction Mechanism to address situations of crisis in the Pacific’.
10. ←This system is based on the idea that the ‘primary gap in civilian capacity is substantive first, and then administrative and logistical’ (Chandran et al. 2009, p. 5, 8).

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