Civil-Military Interaction Seminar 2010 – Advancing Civil-Military Effectiveness in Conflicts and Disasters: From Theory to Practice – Summary Report

Convention Centre, Darling Harbour, Sydney, Australia
7–9 December 2010

Compiled by Sarah Shteir, Research Project Officer, Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence

June 2011

I. Executive Summary

Concerted effort is being taken by States and non-state actors to achieve more effective civil-military-police engagement to help prevent, prepare for and respond more effectively to disasters and conflicts. There is widespread acceptance and agreement that successful disaster and conflict management is directly correlated to the extent of dialogue and coordination among civilian, military and police actors operating in the same environment. While partnership between disparate actors may not always be possible, mutual knowledge and understanding is a minimum requirement. Governments as well as international organisations (IOs) and non-government organisations (NGOs) are now placing greater emphasis on understanding the distinct, but often related, responsibilities of civilian, military and police actors in these efforts. Different actors are using different terms and approaches to describe this engagement, including: civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), civil-military coordination (CMCoord), the comprehensive approach, 3Cs (cohesion, complementarity, coordination), 3Ds (diplomacy, defence, development), integrated missions, and multiagency collaboration.

To examine these issues, the Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence (the Centre) hosted the second annual Civil-Military Interaction Seminar (CMIS) in Darling Harbour, Sydney, Australia from 6-9 December 2010.¹ Framed by the theme Advancing Civil-Military Effectiveness in Conflicts and Disasters: From Theory to Practice, the seminar sought to capture the responsibilities for civilian, police and military actors with the goal of enhancing effectiveness in international conflict and disaster management.² The three-day seminar focused on three distinct but related themes: 1) conflict management: working together and separately; 2) transitions: from peacekeeping to peacebuilding; and 3) disaster preparedness and response.

The presentations and discussions provided numerous conceptual takeaways that addressed the importance of working better together in both conflict and disaster management. Trends and developments were explored. These highlighted the considerable attention being focused on improving comprehensive efforts in conflict and disaster crisis situations at local, national, regional and international levels. Arrangements, mechanisms and tools are being developed, enhanced, and fine-tuned to facilitate comprehensive, civil-military operations. In conflict contexts, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada and Sweden are all actively involved in building comprehensive civil-military conflict management architectures, reflected in the development of strategic guidance and in operations in the field. In disaster contexts, considerable advances are being made in the Asia Pacific region to enhance mechanisms and tools to guide civil-military disaster response efforts. Many of these efforts reflect recognition of the need to move away from personality-driven coordination and cooperation toward building institutional capacity and capabilities to support comprehensive civil-military programs.

The seminar identified a range of good practices. Many of these practices point to the importance of regular dialogue and interaction among civil-military actors at all stages, from training and planning through to implementation and evaluation. These practices include secondments and collocation, joint training and exercises, and comprehensive evaluation and assessment processes. Despite this progress, participants highlighted challenges to be overcome in enhancing civil-military effectiveness. These challenges covered a wide range of issues, though many of them relate to, and derive from, issues of limited capacity and capability, the complexity and chaos of the conflict and disaster environments, and the diversity of actors deploying into these environments.

Although the challenges outnumbered the good practices, participants put forward various solutions and identified a number of priorities for enhancing effectiveness in international conflict and disaster management, the majority of which focused on education, awareness-raising, training and doctrine. These suggestions addressed joint training and exercises, training programs that specifically focused on raising awareness about the backgrounds, mandates, and language/terminology used by different civil-military actors, and the development of dedicated capacities focused on facilitating civil-military engagement.

The presentations and discussions during the three-day seminar highlighted a number of common themes. These included: dealing with the reality of chaos in conflict and disaster environments; the importance of consequence management; the importance of leadership informed by the realities from the field; the need for trust in civil-military coordination; the importance of regular interaction and dialogue; the importance of acknowledging the benefits of civil-military engagement, especially the comparative advantages of diverse actors; the inherent and unavoidable challenges of civil-military interaction; the need for tailored responses; and the importance of capturing lessons and applying them to improve future actions. The dominant theme throughout CMIS was the importance of actors achieving a common understanding of the situation, and the development of mechanisms to assist in this process. There was consensus on the need for all actors to work harder to develop a common understanding of the situation and of the need for greater empowerment of the host country and its local communities in decision making and implementation.

The three days of discussion highlighted the fact that locally, nationally, regionally and globally, civilian and military actors are gaining experience in working together. This engagement helps build a shared language and shared goals. As these efforts demonstrate, this is an ever-evolving process and effort.

II. Background

CMIS 2010 brought together more than 140 participants representing 18 countries, the United Nations and the African Union. The three-day seminar focused on three distinct but related themes: 1) conflict management: working together and separately; 2) transitions: from peacekeeping to peacebuilding; and 3) disaster preparedness and response. The seminar comprised keynote presentations, case studies, panel discussions and working group consideration. A highlight of the seminar was a keynote presentation by international counterinsurgency and Afghanistan expert Dr David Kilcullen at a dinner hosted by the Parliamentary Secretary for Defence, Senator the Honourable David Feeney, and sponsored by Minter Ellison Lawyers. Networking was also prominent with working relationships developed and strengthened amongst civilian, police and military practitioners from around the world.

The objectives of CMIS 2010 were to:

• explore developments in civil-military-police engagement for conflict and disaster management;
• develop an understanding of civil-military-police ‘best practice’ in conflict and disaster management;
• identify gaps, and posit solutions, between strategic direction and operational implementation; and
• highlight key civil-military-police priorities that would enhance performance in conflict and disaster interventions.

This report summarises key trends and developments, good practices, challenges and gaps, and solutions and priorities identified and highlighted during the three days of presentations and discussions. This summary report also considers numerous common themes linking the distinct but related issues of conflict management, peacebuilding, and disaster preparedness and response. The report concludes with a list of the documents and resources that were referenced and circulated during the seminar.

III. Conflict Management: Working Together and Separately

The first day of CMIS 2010 focused on ‘Conflict Management: Working Together and Separately’. It comprised a keynote address by a representative of the Australian Government; a panel on the national approaches of the United Kingdom, Sweden and Canada; a panel looking at the approaches of the United Nations, regional organisations, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and the NGO community, on civil-military-police relations during conflict; case studies on Afghanistan, Darfur and the Solomon Islands; and working group discussions.

Fragile and conflict-affected states are a defining feature of the world today. The complexity of these situations necessitates a long-term multifaceted response that draws upon political, security and development efforts. The resulting multidimensional conflict management space is rife with tension, conflict, and opportunity.

i. Key Trends & Developments

Ongoing Evolution of National Comprehensive Conflict Management Arrangements

As conflict situations are constantly evolving and in flux, so too are national approaches to conflict management. As CMIS participants heard, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada and Sweden are all actively involved in building comprehensive civil-military conflict management architectures. Though the aims are similar, the arrangements sit within unique political, cultural, bureaucratic, social, and financial contexts. It was observed that, for smaller governments, achieving a comprehensive and integrated architecture was less difficult than for larger states. Understandably, the smaller size of government bureaucracies more easily enable networks and working relationships, critical to cohesive conflict and disaster management arrangements.

In Australia, a whole-of-government national security architecture is being built with a focus on coordination and coherence to support a common strategic framework. There are now over thirty Commonwealth departments and agencies included in the ‘national security community’, including the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the Department of Defence and the Australian Defence Force (ADF), the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD), the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Australian Intelligence Community. In addition, Australian state and territory agencies and representatives from industry are also increasingly contributing to Australia’s national security thinking. The establishment of the new National Security College is also contributing to innovative thinking, and helping build networks between those with an interest in national security.

Australia’s integrated, whole-of-government approach is demonstrated through its operations in countries including East Timor, the Solomon Islands, and Afghanistan, where achieving stability and security demands a multidimensional response. While the contribution of the ADF is perhaps the most visible element of Australia’s involvement in Afghanistan, Australia’s military efforts have been increasingly complemented by the work of civilian agencies, including the AFP, DFAT and AusAID, conducting training, governance and capacity-building activities. In the Solomon Islands by contrast, the ADF has primarily undertaken a supporting role to the efforts of other government departments where governance, the rule of law and development have gone beyond the restoration and maintenance of a secure environment. These varying approaches indicate that there is no ‘one size fits all’ in crisis management.

In the United Kingdom, there is currently a change underway as the architecture evolves from a comprehensive approach toward an integrated approach characterised by ‘one stabilisation space, one plan…supported by one Whitehall structure’. This shift is visible in the participation of civilian stabilisation officers in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Helmund Province, Afghanistan (also the case for other countries’ PRTs), and in the evolving approach of the UK military to stabilisation operations; military doctrine now utilises stabilisation language and new military concepts include ‘strategic patience’ and ‘courageous restraint’, both of which acknowledge the importance of a long-term development framework within which these operations are situated. This approach is supported and facilitated by the UK Stabilisation Unit (SU), a cross-government unit that reports to the National Security Council through the Building Stabilisation Overseas Board.

Canada is moving in a similar direction to the United Kingdom. Having experienced a ‘siloed’ ‘3D’ approach, Canada is now focused on shifting to an integrated approach. In Afghanistan, this integrated approach is reflected in the development of a ‘single narrative’ for Canadian engagement, provided via six common priorities shared by all agencies and departments. In this integrated context, polio eradication has become a priority not only for the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), but the Canadian military as well, influencing when the military organises its ‘days of tranquillity’, for example. This shift is supported by the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) in Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, which is responsible for facilitating multiagency operations. Canada is also focusing its attention beyond whole-of-government to ‘whole-of-system’ capacities. This approach is based on Canada’s experience in countries where a whole-of-government approach has proved insufficient.

Continuing Efforts toward Integration in UN Peacekeeping Operations

Mission integration is now the norm for UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Processes and structures are intended to facilitate integration at the planning, training and implementation stages of peacekeeping operations, among civilian, police and military personnel within the mission as well as integration with other UN actors operating in the host country (the UN Country Team [UNCT]). To facilitate integrated planning, various procedures have been established including Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTF) and integrated Technical Assessment Missions (TAM). To facilitate integrated training and capacity building, existing structures include Integrated Mission Training Cells (IMTC), Standardized Generic Training Modules (SGTM), and Senior Mission Leadership (SML) training courses.³ To enable integrated implementation within peacekeeping operations, a range of different structures have been established including the Mission Leadership Team (MLT), Joint Operations Centre (JOC), Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) , Integrated Support Service (ISS), and Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC). This architecture is supported and guided by a number of documents including United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, known as the Capstone Doctrine (2008), A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for United Nations Peacekeeping (2009), and The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No.1 (2010). Additional guidance, recently released, is ‘Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ (2011), developed by the Challenges Forum Project in conjunction with DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS).⁴

ii. Good Practices

Secondments, Liaisons, Exchanges

Secondments, liaisons and exchanges help build relationships and assist in knowledge-sharing. Such personnel exchanges or placements help foster understanding of the organisational practices and procedures of different agencies, all of which are required for building interoperability. Participants highlighted a number of examples of these practices: START has seconded staff to the Department of Defence and the Canadian Forces Staff College; and the African Union has begun a desk-to-desk military and police exchange program with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). It is important to note that such practices should occur in an organisational environment that recognises the value in such work and does not penalise those who select such secondments, liaisons or exchanges (see more in Challenges & Gaps).

Joint/Integrated Training, Exercises

The United Nations has developed various arrangements to facilitate integrated training, including for senior mission leadership and incoming peacekeeping personnel in multidimensional peacekeeping operations. At a national level, the Folke Bernadotte Academy in Sweden has a strong mandated focus on, and key role in, conducting multidimensional training. There is a growing civilian presence in military-led exercises, although this approach is still in its infancy.

Collocation

In the multiagency Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), the civilian Special Coordinator, and the Police and Military Commanders are collocated. According to one participant, this has proved hugely beneficial to civil-military coordination in the mission.

Capturing Comprehensive Lessons

While participants acknowledged the challenge of capturing whole-of-government lessons learned in conflict contexts (compared to disaster situations), a number of good practices were highlighted that are currently being implemented by various national arrangements. These practices include: ensuring the same questions are asked in After-Action Reviews for personnel in the field and at headquarters-level; and conducting real-time lessons-gathering on-the-ground, after which the analyses are submitted to a high-level civil-military ‘lessons board’. Participants noted that the strong relationships among the various national civil-military stabilisation arrangements, such as the UK SU and Canada’s START help to prevent duplication in capturing lessons.

iii. Challenges & Gaps

Investing in Civilian Capacities & Capabilities

To ensure that civil-military interaction is not personality-driven – and not ‘reliant on the same fifteen experts’ as one participant noted – the cadre of multiagency experts must be expanded by building institutional civilian deployable capacity and capability. While considerable progress is being made in efforts to invest in civilian capabilities for conflict management, including such initiatives as the Australian Civilian Corps (ACC), participants highlighted the need for greater effort and focus in this area. For example, the AU’s African Standby Force (ASF), being built as a multidimensional force, was currently understaffed in the civilian pillar. Its weak civilian capability stood in marked contrast to comparatively well-staffed and developed military and police components. The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) is assisting the ASF to build its civilian capacity.

In contrast to military forces, civilian agencies are at a major disadvantage, as they are not structured to have redundant capabilities. This imbalance in capabilities between military and civilian actors can present considerable challenges in achieving civil-military effectiveness. In the context of Afghanistan, Dr David Kilcullen observed that, despite the growth in civilian participation, civilians are being ‘outpaced’ by the capabilities of military forces. Unlike well-established support structures for military forces, as was explained by one participant, there are currently no national structures in place to systematically and comprehensively address recruitment, insurance, reintegration support, after-deployment care, and finances for civilian personnel.

Diversity of International Actors

Conflict environments are populated by a diversity of international actors. This diversity presents considerable challenges for coordination and integration in conflict management. Actors deploy with different national and organisational cultural approaches, aims and mandates, experience, ‘rules of engagement’, rotation schedules, accountabilities, and capabilities. This diversity is a challenge not only in the case of the prevalent civil-military divide, but also among civilian organisations. For example, one NGO participant highlighted the challenge for humanitarian NGOs who must share the ‘humanitarian space’ with multi-mandated NGOs involved simultaneously with (highly political) nation-building activities and humanitarian activities.

Narrow Career Prospects in Multiagency Work

A common problem identified by many of the countries represented at CMIS was the narrow career prospects for multiagency work. One participant observed that, although horizontal cooperation (cooperation between agencies) is important, it is not necessarily rewarded, nor are multiagency competencies yet consistently recognised. Yet, this appears to be changing. In Canada there is growing recognition at senior levels of the need for a pool of people with multiagency competencies. Furthermore, START has recently finalised a learning plan and professional development plan, which will help encourage recognition within the government about the professional legitimacy of this work. Also, in the United Kingdom, among military personnel, the SU is being recognised as a valuable employment opportunity.

Moving beyond Whole-of-Government

While a whole-of-government approach is being implemented by many of the countries represented at CMIS, there was recognition among participants of the importance of moving to a whole-of-system approach. This more comprehensive and inclusive approach would require governments to systematically engage with and incorporate the wider non-governmental community, including UN offices, NGOs, IOs, industry, and the private sector. After all, many of these non-governmental actors are present long before a whole-of-government state effort arrives on the scene, and long after it leaves.

Subordination of Humanitarian Concerns to Political Objectives

According to an NGO participant, the United Nations and Governments sometimes present considerable challenges to NGOs by subordinating humanitarian concerns to advance political agendas. Specifically, humanitarian assistance is sometimes used as an ‘entry point’ in situations where the political issues are ‘much harder to deal with’.

Absence of Benchmarks

Benchmarks and indicators are a critical and well-established means of measuring progress, and represent important tools for use in measuring progress on civil-military engagement. Such metrics are currently lacking, though some countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States are making progress in this critical area. It was acknowledged, however, that ‘templated’ solutions could not be applied, and that each situation requires a tailored response.

Importance of the Host Country

A persistent comment by many participants was the essential need for international interventions to work more closely with host governments and local communities. While recognising the inherent difficulties, it was acknowledged that sustainable peace could only be achieved through local ownership and long-term international commitment.

iv. Solutions & Priorities

The following key solutions and priorities were identified by participants during the seminar:

• Develop training programs to ensure civilian, military and police actors have a basic awareness of each other’s missions, mandates and backgrounds. These programs could include a guide to the acronyms and ‘jargon’ used by the various organisations operating in the same space.⁵
• Prioritise joint exercises, joint simulations and training sessions, especially where joint civil-military operations are being deployed. Decision-makers should be regularly involved in such training efforts.
• Ensure closer linkages and feedback between strategic/policy decision-makers and operations in the field.

IV. Transitions: From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding

The second day of CMIS 2010 focused on ‘Transitions: From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding’. It comprised a scene-setting address by a serving UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the challenges of peacebuilding; a panel on issues of peacebuilding; Timor-Leste case studies; working group discussions; and a dinner with guest speaker Dr David Kilcullen.

The title of the second day of CMIS was widely acknowledged to be a misnomer because peacekeeping and peacebuilding are not sequential phases, or alternatives, but parallel and related activities. Peacekeeping is one of many policy instruments available to support a peacebuilding process. There are a number of different peacebuilding roles that peacekeepers can play: they can help governments articulate peacebuilding priorities; they can enable other national and international actors to implement peacebuilding activities through the provision of a security umbrella; and they can implement peacebuilding tasks themselves, such as capacity-building projects.

Peacebuilding programs occur in a variety of environments. They may be conducted with a peacekeeping presence, such as in Liberia and Timor-Leste; in situations of long-standing semi-crises where there is no peacekeeping presence, such as Guinea-Bissau; and also in situations where there are high-levels of violence, such as in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Somalia, for which such activities are often termed ‘conflictual peacebuilding’.

i. Key Trends & Developments

Increasing Focus on Transitions

Peacekeeping has gone from a period of surge to consolidation and drawdown. This has led to greater focus on the dynamics of, and requirements for, transition. This topic is occupying considerable attention in policy debates within the UN Security Council and General Assembly, as well as within other regional organisations and coalitions. As was explained by one participant, ‘transition’ refers to the process of removing the international security umbrella, and human, financial and logistical support that a peacekeeping operation provides, transferring authority to national counterparts, and handing over tasks, where necessary, to the UNCT. Depending on the context, peacekeeping missions may face varying levels of pressure regarding the transition timeline. In some situations, the host country and some member States may prefer a fast exit by peacekeepers, and missions may face external pressure to hasten transition, while in other situations the mission is wanted for the long-term. The latter is the situation in Timor-Leste, where the national government supports a gradual two-year transition process. This increasing focus on transitions is significant from a coordination and integration perspective as a transition environment requires considerable coordination, and also further diversifies the pool of actors that missions may need to engage with.

UN Conceptual Shift to a Peacebuilding Paradigm

As participants heard, 10 years ago there was almost no mention of peacebuilding. Since then, there has been a gradual conceptual shift from traditional peacekeeping to a multidimensional peacekeeping paradigm, and most recently, to a peacebuilding paradigm. Peacekeeping is increasingly being understood as a tool in this overall peacebuilding paradigm.

Increasing Southeast Asian Role in Peacebuilding

According to one participant, there is a palpable increase in willingness, interest and capacity within Southeast Asia to participate in peacebuilding. This is reflected in a number of developments. The ‘recrafting’ of the regional architecture of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), notably the ASEAN Security Community, enables a more effective institutionalized collective response to security challenges, including post-conflict peacebuilding. The ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint reflects a change in attitude from the conventional principles of non-interference and state sovereignty, and raises the significance of cooperation, including regional contributions to peacebuilding. While an increasing number of ASEAN countries have a history of involvement in peacekeeping operations – including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore, there is increasing capacity, experience and interest in a number of non-military areas of direct relevance to peacebuilding, including institution-building (Malaysia), engineering and medical support (Thailand), and demining (Cambodia and Vietnam). To further support this capacity-building, peacekeeping training centres have been, or are being, established in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Cambodia.

ii. Good Practices

Wide Consultation on Transition Benchmarks

The experience in UNMIT highlights the usefulness of developing benchmarks for transition in consultation with national counterparts, as it ensures a ‘shared analytical framework for navigating transition’. The UNCT must also be part of this dialogue, assuming responsibility for outstanding tasks, and to ensure a smooth transition within the UN community.

Horizontal and Vertical Communication on Transition

Outreach campaigns are critical to explain what the transition means both for communities as well as national staff, and a mission’s partners. As part of UNMIT’s process of transition, priority has been given to ensuring that the transition process is transparent. Toward this end, the Mission has organised town hall meetings, and conducted outreach via television, radio and the internet.

Collocation with Recipients of Peacebuilding Assistance

As part of the AFP-run Timor-Leste Police Development Program (TLPDT) in Timor-Leste, AFP personnel are physically collocated with their Timorese counterparts, the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL). This collocation helps to build relationships and trust and ensures a more nuanced understanding of the local environment.

Culturally Appropriate Approaches to Peacebuilding

The government of Timor-Leste has drawn heavily on their own cultural background in their peacebuilding efforts. The legal system, for example, is based on principles of reconciliation: the penal code has a strong emphasis on community labour, as an alternative to the less culturally appropriate approach of prison terms and fines. The need for appropriate local transitional justice mechanisms should be established early during an intervention, and then transitioned to local ownership as part of the peacebuilding process.

iii. Challenges & Gaps

Sustaining Daily Focus on Integration in Large Complex Missions

As participants heard, large and complex missions present practical challenges in building an integrated approach. The immediacy of political and security priorities faced by a mission leader leaves little time to devote to the practice of integration, and may mean that the UNCT is left to work by itself.

Institutional Implications of UN Peacebuilding Paradigm

According to some participants, the shift to a peacebuilding-dominant paradigm is not yet adequately reflected institutionally within the United Nations. The increasing focus on transitions requires an expanded pool of mission professionals and institutional partners. There is greater acknowledgement within the UN Security Council, for example, of the need for a strengthened relationship with, and greater input from, the Peacebuilding Commission. An improved relationship with the Peacebuilding Commission, in particular, will also assist in determining which body is most appropriate for oversight and leadership of the peacebuilding process.

Peacekeepers as Peacebuilders

While this peacebuilding paradigm shift frames peacekeepers as peacebuilders, there are clear tensions between the goals of peacebuilding and peacekeeping, highlighted by one participant. These tensions can originate from conflicts within mandates and also basic operational realities. As has been demonstrated in the peacekeeping mission in DRC (formerly MONUC, now MONUSCO), peacekeepers had a mandate that included protection of civilians, and simultaneously were mandated to help build the capacity of the national army, which had proven to be a perpetrator of abuses against those very same civilians. In addition, peacekeepers are bound by a zero-tolerance policy against sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). This policy can restrict engagement with the local population. While this restriction is important for ensuring the safety of civilians from SEA, the distance it creates between the mission and the local population creates challenges in building local confidence in peacebuilding. As well, the operational reality of frequent peacekeeper rotations, often every 6-12 months, limits the knowledge that peacekeepers can gain about the local context and limits their effectiveness as ‘peacebuilders’. Continuing insecurity in the host country, especially in environments of conflictual peacebuilding, may also limit the ability of civilian staff to engage with local populations, again a basic requirement in peacebuilding efforts.

Safeguarding Humanitarian Principles

The tension between safeguarding humanitarian principles and using military peacekeepers to facilitate the timely provision of assistance to communities in need is not new. Nonetheless, this is one of the peacebuilding roles that peacekeepers can provide. Indeed, following persistent attacks against World Food Programme (WFP) trucks in Darfur, Sudan, trucks from the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) were dispatched to accompany WFP trucks to facilitate their delivery of assistance. This arrangement was preceded by ‘painstaking negotiations’ with the humanitarian community.

Ambitions versus Abilities

As was explained by one participant, the emphasis on peacebuilding comes at a time when operating environments are more complex due in part to the proliferation of actors, and when resources are diminished or diminishing. From a financial perspective, the long-term nature of peacebuilding presents a significant challenge to maintaining public attention and securing and sustaining funding in the face of donor fatigue and the reality of donor countries’ electoral cycles. Importantly, there is increasing awareness and acknowledgment among Member States that the financial situation facing missions is problematic. Indicative of this acknowledgement, the members of the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, responsible for administrative and budgetary matters, recently visited the field to see firsthand the financial challenges faced by peacekeeping missions.

Elite-centric Peacebuilding Engagement

In their peacebuilding efforts there can be a tendency for international actors to engage with elite members of the population rather than local communities. This approach disregards the roles, efforts, and abilities of local actors, including local civil society groups. As one participant observed, it has become almost a truism that local ownership is an end, but it is not seen as a means. Considering that peacebuilding needs to be a national and locally owned, process, as was repeatedly emphasised by CMIS participants, too narrow a focus on elites can be counterproductive and potentially damaging to long-term peacebuilding efforts.

Highly Political Nature of Peacebuilding

The case studies on Timor-Leste provided a clear illustration of the highly political nature of peacebuilding and the consequences of ignoring this reality. This is especially pertinent in countries that have experienced long periods of conflict, where there are entrenched rivalries and power relations. As one participant reflected with the benefit of hindsight, the early peacebuilding decisions made by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) before 2002 had a huge impact on the way power was distributed, creating winners and losers. Some of these decisions cultivated anger and frustration and contributed to the renewal of violence in 2006.

iv. Solutions & Priorities

The following key solutions and priorities were identified by participants during the seminar:

• Ensure peacekeeping missions have a peacebuilding focus from the start.
• In large integrated peacekeeping missions, identify a dedicated staff member to support the mission leadership in sustaining the process of integration with UN agencies.
• Prioritise a modest peacebuilding approach, based on an honest examination of ambitions.
• To help facilitate a shift away from elite-dominated peacebuilding engagement, deploy key peacebuilding staff outside of capitals to live among the local communities. Not only will this help build relationships but it will also ensure more nuanced assessments of country situations.
• Include peacebuilding in pre-mission training for troop and police-contributing countries. More work is required to design relevant training packages.

V. Disaster Preparedness and Response⁶

The third and final day of CMIS 2010 focused on ‘Disaster Preparedness and Response’. It comprised a scene-setting address from the U.S. Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COE-DMHA) on ‘Civil-Military Disaster Response: What lessons have we not yet learned?’; a panel on policy development in the Asia-Pacific Region; case studies on the July 2010 Pakistan floods; working group discussions; and a rapporteur report-back and closing remarks.

Generally speaking, civil-military tensions and sensitivities are not as prominent in situations of disaster as they are in conflicts. There appears to be greater willingness for civil-military engagement in disaster situations. This is perhaps not surprising given that there has been considerable experience with international civil-military disaster response in recent years: the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the 2006 Pakistan earthquake, the 2009 Indonesian earthquake, and the 2010 Pakistan floods were examples referenced by participants. Also, the civil-military disaster response space has become increasingly crowded: there were approximately 400 NGOs on the ground following the 2004 Tsunami in Aceh, Indonesia; and in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake, 200 different needs assessments were conducted in a four-day period by U.S. organisations alone. Participants concurred that given the likelihood of many more mega-disasters in the Asia-Pacific, the manner in which this crowded civil-military space is managed and navigated will become increasingly important.

i. Key Trends & Developments

Increasing Asia-Pacific Ownership of Disaster Preparedness and Response

The Asia-Pacific region has been at the forefront of disaster preparedness and response; unsurprising considering the disaster risks facing countries in the region. A key turning point in regional civil-military coordination for disaster relief was the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Since then increased attention has been given to the development of civil-military guidelines. As well, there has been increased focus on disaster preparedness and disaster risk reduction (DRR). As participants heard, Indonesia has increased its efforts to manage national disasters and to reduce its reliance on foreign assistance, including through the development of permanent disaster management institutions at national and sub-national levels, the drafting of disaster management legislation, and the integration of disaster risk management (DRM) and DRR into national and sub-national development plans. A notable example of this trend is the newly established Indonesian Rapid Response and Assistance Force (INDRRA), a civil-military-police interdisciplinary force. Community-driven processes are also a critical aspect of this focus. For example, the 2007 Indonesian Disaster Management Law provides for multi-stakeholder disaster risk reduction forums at national and sub-national levels, including civil society organizations. Strong civil society roles have already been seen in the case of the disaster response to the 2010 Mount Merapi volcanic eruption. Another example is the establishment of the Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR), an AusAID-funded initiative that is a partnership between the Australian and Indonesian governments, with both a national and regional purview.

Asia-Pacific Regional Guidance on Civil-Military Engagement in Disaster Response

The Asia-Pacific region is witnessing considerable activity in the development of guidance for managing civil-military relations in disaster response. One notable example, presented to participants is the ongoing multi-year effort by the Asia-Pacific Conference on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations (APC-MADRO) to develop the ‘Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in National Disaster Response Operations’. The Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines are intended to be read in conjunction with the Oslo Guidelines on ‘The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief’. Unlike the Oslo Guidelines, which are mostly focused at the principles level, the Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines present an operational guide, written for military commanders and their planning staff. It is intended for military staff being rapidly deployed to disaster situations with no experience in planning and operations in disaster environments. The development of this document reflects the reality that the various global guidelines that exist need to be tailored for more appropriate regional applicability. The most recent APC-MADRO meeting had decided to conduct testing and validation of the guidelines before endorsement.

There are currently multiple existing guidelines, prepared by/for disparate actors working in the disaster response domain, many of which have been developed in isolation from one another, leading to considerable duplication. As one participant explained, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, the Association of South East Asian Nations, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community and the Pacific Islands Applied Geoscience Commission are among those organisations that have developed or are developing such guidelines. These guidelines include the ASEAN Standby Arrangements and Standard Operating Procedures (SASOPs), including the SOP for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (tactical focus), and the ASEAN Regional Forum Strategic Guidance for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (strategic focus).

ii. Good Practices

Civil-Military Learning Environment

The Australian civil-military Medical Taskforce (Operation PAKISTAN ASSIST II) sent to Punjab Province, Pakistan, following the 2010 floods, provided a critical learning environment for those ADF medical staff with limited experience with the high volume of patients (‘patient flood’), as well as the health problems presented. The multiagency environment, therefore, enabled them to observe and learn from their civilian counterparts.

Local Ownership of Disaster Risk Reduction, Preparedness and Response

Local communities, including families and local businesses, must be responsible for and, feel a sense of ownership of, disaster risk reduction, preparedness and response efforts. Such responsibility and ownership was visible in response to the Mount Merapi volcanic eruption in Indonesia. According to one participant, an effective response to the disaster was due in part to the strong local disaster management agency and supporting role from the local DRR Forum. This response structure facilitated engagement between local civil society organisations (CSOs) and the Indonesian Military.

‘Build Back Better’ Campaigns – ‘Converting adversity into opportunity’

Numerous participants referenced the use of ‘Build Back Better’ campaigns in disaster response efforts. In response to the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, for example, Build Back Better initiatives included changing water collection points, implementing more culturally appropriate housing designs, and introducing experimental farming practices. In the case of the former, changing the water points reduced the number of hours required by women to collect water, giving them more time for educational and other opportunities, and also enabled more girls to enrol in school as less of their time was consumed helping their mothers collect water.

Working in Non-Permissive Disaster Environments

Humanitarian organisations have made progress in learning how to operate in non-permissive disaster environments. As participants heard, improvements have been made in the way organisations build national capacity in their offices, work with national partners (national governments and national NGOs), and institute better models for remote programme delivery.

iii. Challenges & Gaps

Principle of Last Resort

Discussion on the 2010 Pakistan Floods during the seminar presented a useful illustration of the ever-present, inherent tension between the principle of using military assets as last resort and the desire to utilise the military comparative advantage when possible to enable timely assistance. As explained by one participant, in response to the floods the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) offered to fly in relief goods. According to another participant, UN organisations faced pressure to accept this assistance. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) declined the offer of NATO flights since it was determined that other options remained and did not warrant military involvement, and accepted support from non-NATO ships to transport relief. A Pakistani participant expressed frustration with the OCHA decision to decline NATO flights and the comparative advantage of their capabilities over the much slower option of non-NATO ships, remarking ‘we didn’t see any ships!’ After consideration the Pakistan authorities authorised the use of NATO assets.

Cluster Approach

As one participant noted, the cluster approach is not fully effective, ‘but it is the best we have’. It was observed that it seems to work well in certain types of disasters, such as slow-onset disasters. In contrast, one participant suggested that the cluster system did not work well in Haiti, identifying the lack of leadership and inexperience among the personnel involved in the coordination structure as the main causes. To further complicate matters, it was recalled that there have been instances where national governments have adopted their own versions of the cluster system in parallel to the UN coordination system.

Achieving a Common Picture among Disparate Actors

Civil-military coordination is more than talking or exchanging information; it is about achieving a shared understanding of the situation, the needs and requirements, and available capabilities and capacities. This is no easy feat and raises various critical questions: how do you develop a common, synergised understanding of a situation between and among disparate actors? How can you aggregate all the different needs assessments that have been conducted? How do you achieve a common view of the requirements for an effective disaster response?

Assimilating Military Actors into Wider Disaster Response Effort

Though it was agreed that the military can play an important role in disaster response, some participants thought that the military’s integration into the wider response effort is not an automatic or easy process. It was noted, for example, that where the military have tried to be value-adding, they have sometimes faced difficulties fitting-in and being ‘assimilated’ into the wider response effort.

Dearth of Capacity & Capability at National and Regional-Levels

The absence of in-country and regional capacity and capability in disaster response was noted by a number of participants. In the case of the Pakistan Floods, the security situation and resulting slow deployment of international staff highlighted the absence of a regional or sub-regional surge capacity mechanism to provide primary surge capacity. Similar capacity and capability challenges were highlighted in relation to national disaster risk management in Indonesia, for example, where basic core competencies are lacking among local and national structures.

iv. Solutions & Priorities

The following key solutions and priorities were identified by participants during the seminar:

• Conduct joint pre-deployment briefings, joint exercises, joint simulations and joint training sessions, especially in advance of civil-military operations. Decision-makers should be regularly involved in such programs.
• Give greater consideration to a whole-of-system reality in disaster scenarios, especially considering that many development and humanitarian organisations are operating before governmental actors arrive and remaining long after they leave.
• Develop national and regional disaster response surge capacity mechanisms.
• Develop local capacity for DRR and DRM, including through the distribution of community grants, the development of community-based DRM programs that link district and provincial institutions, and community-based research on DRR.
• Prioritise greater professional education for military actors to support their role, and guide their operations within civil-military disaster response efforts. This should include mainstreaming civil-military disaster guidelines into the education and training systems of national militaries (centres of excellence are ideally suited to support this educational effort).

VI. Common Themes

Though the themes of conflict management, peacebuilding, and disaster management were principally addressed as discrete topics, the civil-military interaction lens illuminates linkages and coherence between them. As many participants observed, there are overlaps in approaches, values and priorities between conflict and disaster environments. The lines between conflict and disaster are further blurred where disasters occur in ongoing conflict situations, such as the floods in Pakistan and the earthquake in Haiti. The presentations and discussions during the three-day seminar highlighted numerous common themes across these discrete but related fields, which are elaborated below.

Chaos

Conflict and disaster environments are characterised by chaos. This chaos is caused not just by the conflict or disaster situation itself but by the response, in particular the large number of ‘eclectic’ national and international actors that respond to the crisis. These situations require flexibility, adaptability, patience and commitment.

Consequence Management

Large decisions are made at all levels in crisis management – whether in a conflict or disaster environment. These decisions have a cascading effect, and often cannot be reversed. Decisions should therefore be made cautiously, and consequences (from the strategic to the field level) should be considered carefully.

Informed Leadership

There can be a ‘disconnect’ between the strategic, operational and tactical levels. To bridge this gap, leadership ought to engage with field staff and local communities, including through regular field visits and participation in training initiatives such as civil-military exercises. Strategic leaders, including members of the UN Security Council, need to undertake regular field visits to ensure the relevance and achievability of political decisions.

Trust

Trust is a critical component of civil-military coordination. It helps to facilitate mutual understanding, which is critical in a situation of chaos, whether it be in a conflict or disaster environment. Yet, the very nature of civil-military coordination poses considerable challenges to trust-building.

Interaction and Dialogue

Regular interaction and dialogue are critical for helping diverse actors build trust, understanding of each other’s approaches, capabilities and arrangements, and relationships. The exchanges among civilian and military actors during CMIS 2010 demonstrated the significance of creating opportunities for interaction and dialogue.

Benefits of Civil-Military Engagement

In a multiagency chaotic environment, it is important to acknowledge the value of different actors, including their disparate capacities and capabilities. The comparative advantages of diverse actors enable agility and responsiveness.

Challenges of Civil-Military Interaction

Civil-military interaction has inherent difficulties. As one participant explained, coordination involves power relations; it creates winners and losers, and can be highly political. In this context, it is worthwhile to acknowledge that tensions are inevitable. Differences in language, experience, culture, and approach ensure that tensions will exist in a multidimensional environment. It is for this reason that strong relationships are so critical for interoperability.

Need for Tailored Responses

It was widely acknowledged and continually noted that every response must be context-driven and tailored to the needs on the ground. The 2010 Pakistan Floods presented a clear illustration of this need: the floods, which were described both as a ‘slow moving tsunami’ and a ‘slow burn’ lasting four months, presented a situation for which there was clearly no appropriate cookie-cutter response.

Lessons Learned

As one participant remarked, the sheer scale of disasters means that the same mistakes will sometimes be repeated. A number of participants questioned the use of the term ‘lessons learned’ suggesting that lessons were frequently documented but not applied. Whether or not this is the case, the concept of ‘lessons learned’ is about translating knowledge and experience into institutional actions and measures of effectiveness that benefit the wider civil-military community and the affected population.

VII. Conclusion

The aim of CMIS 2010 was to help bridge concepts, theory and practice regarding civil-military-police engagement in conflict and disaster management. The objectives, as stated in section I, were to explore developments, identify best practices and gaps, highlight priorities and posit solutions. The presentations and discussions provided numerous conceptual takeaways that addressed the importance of working better together in both conflict and disaster management. Trends and developments were explored, highlighting the considerable attention being focused on improving comprehensive efforts in crisis situations at local, national, regional and international levels. It was noted that there has been significant progress on civil-military coordination, but that considerable work remains. The seminar identified a range of good practices, many of which point to the importance of regular dialogue and interaction among civil-military actors at all stages, from training and planning through to implementation and evaluation. While there has been progress in this field, participants highlighted challenges to be overcome in enhancing civil-military effectiveness. While the challenges outnumbered the good practices, participants put forward various solutions and identified a number of priorities for enhancing effectiveness in international conflict and disaster management. Interestingly, the majority of the solutions and priorities focused on education, awareness-raising, and training. There was consensus on the need for all actors to work harder to develop a common understanding of the situation and of the need for greater empowerment of the host country and its local communities in decision making and implementation.

Locally, nationally, regionally and globally, civilian and military actors are gaining experience in working together. This engagement helps build a shared language and promotes a shared understanding. Civil-military arrangements, including whole-of-government systems, are being developed, enhanced, and fine-tuned to facilitate comprehensive, civil-military operations. Efforts are being made to move away from personality-driven coordination and cooperation toward building institutional capacity and capabilities to support multiagency programs. As these efforts demonstrate, this is an ever-evolving process and effort.

VIII. Key Readings & Resources

Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, ‘Strengthening Australia’s Conflict and Disaster Management Overseas’, 2010, http://civmilcoe.gov.au/resources/publications/strengthening-australia%E2%80%99s-conflict-and-disaster-management-overseas/

–, ‘Realising the ‘Imagined Armies of Expert Civilians’: A Summary of National Civilian Capacity Arrangements for Conflict Management, 2010 (this analysis will be available as an APCMCOE Civil-Military Working Paper at http://civmilcoe.gov.au/resources/publications/)

Asia-Pacific Conferences on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations, ‘Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines For The Use Of Foreign Military Assets In National Disaster Response Operations’, Draft version 8.0, November 2010, http://ochaonline.un.org/roap/APCMADRO/tabid/7303/language/en-US/Default.aspx

Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ‘ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint’, 2009, http://www.aseansec.org/5187-18.pdf

Center on International Cooperation, ‘The Early Peacebuilding Perspective: Strengthening Institutional Linkages between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding’, Meeting Note, 2010, http://www.cic.nyu.edu/leadpage/PBC-SC%20event%20note_6Oct10.pdf

A Donini, ‘Humanitarian Agenda 2015: Principles, Power, and Perceptions – Afghanistan: Humanitarianism under Threat’, Briefing Paper, Feinstein International Center, March 2009, http://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/download/attachments/22520580/Donini-Afghanistan.pdf

R Epstein, ‘Afghan warlord’s private army trained in Australia’, Sydney Morning Herald, 29 October 2010, http://www.smh.com.au/world/afghan-warlords-private-army-trained-in-australia-20101028-175sg.html

P Fishstein, ‘Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Balkh Province’, Feinstein International Center, November 2010, https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=42671653

G Gompelman, ‘Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan’s Faryab Province’, Feinstein International Center, January 2011, https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=42009162

Government of Australia, ‘The First National Security Statement to the Parliament’, Address by the Prime Minister of Australia The Hon. Kevin Rudd MP, 04 December 2008, http://pmrudd.archive.dpmc.gov.au/node/5424

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, ‘Introduction to the Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance’, 2008, http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/41203/introduction-guidelines-en.pdf

International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations and the Challenges Forum Partner Organizations, ‘Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’, 2010, http://challengesforum.org/cms/Considerations_Study_.do?pageId=219

K Melloul, ‘Accidental Partners? Listening to the Australian Defence and Police Experience of the security-development nexus in Conflict-Affected and Fragile States’, a work product of the Trust Fund cooperation between AusAID and the World Bank ’s Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group, prepared on behalf of the World Bank, October 2010

D Oakes, ‘Military chief defends warlord ally’, Sydney Morning Herald, October 30, 2010, http://www.smh.com.au/world/military-chief-defends-warlord-ally-20101029-177iv.html

OneResponse, http://oneresponse.info/Pages/default.aspx

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), ‘Transition Financing: Building a Better Response’, 2010, http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/browseit/4310071E.PDF

Oxfam, ‘Engaging with Communities The Next Challenge for Peacekeeping’, 141 Oxfam Briefing Paper – Summary November 2010, viewed on 28 March 2011 at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/downloads/bp141-engaging-with-communities-221110-summ-en.pdf

Save the Children, ‘At a Crossroads: Humanitarianism for the Next Decade’, 2010, http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/en/54_12550.htm

Solomon Islands Government and Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI),’Partnership Framework Between Solomon Islands Government and Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands’, April 2009, available at: http://www.ramsi.org/about/partnership-framework.html

United Kingdom House of Commons Defence Committee, ‘The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace: Government response to the Committee’s Seventh Report of Session 2009-10’, September 2010, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmdfence/224/224.pdf

United Nations Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No.1, October 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon_update01.pdf

–, A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, July 2009, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf

–, UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine), January 2008, http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf

United Nations General Assembly/Security Council, ‘Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict: Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group’, A/65/747–S/2011/85, 22 February 2011, http://www.civcapreview.org/

United Nations Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance, and the Environment, ‘Delivering as One

Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel’, 9 November 2006, http://www.un.org/events/panel/resources/pdfs/HLP-SWC-FinalReport.pdf

‘Guidelines On The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief – “Oslo Guidelines”’, Updated November 2006 (Revision 1.1 November 2007), http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/AMMF-6VXJVG/$file/OCHA-Nov2006.pdf?openelement

World Bank, ‘World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development, 2011’, http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/fulltext

Acronyms

ACC

Australian Civilian Corps (AusAID, Australian Government)

ACCORD

African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes

ADF

Australian Defence Force

AFP

Australian Federal Police

AGD

Attorney-General’s Department (Australian Government)

AIFDR

Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction

APC-MADRO

Asia Pacific Conference on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations

ARF

ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASEAN SASOPs

ASEAN Standby Arrangements and Standard Operating Procedures

ASF

African Standby Force

AU

African Union

AusAID

Australian Agency for International Development (Australian Government)

Centre

Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence (Department of Defence, Australian Government)

CIDA

Canadian International Development Agency (Canadian Government)

CIMIC

Civil-military Cooperation (military term)

CMCoord

Civil-military Coordination (humanitarian term)

CMIS

Civil-Military Interaction Seminar

COE-DMHA

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (U.S. Government)

CSO

Civil Society Organisation

DFAT

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australian Government)

DFS

Department of Field Support (UN)

DPKO

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)

DRC

Democratic Republic of the Congo

DRM

Disaster Risk Management

DRR

Disaster Risk Reduction

IDG

International Deployment Group (Australian Federal Police, Australian Government)

IMTC

Integrated Mission Training Cell (UN)

IMTF

Integrated Mission Task Force (UN)

INDRRA

Indonesian Disaster Rapid Response and Assistance (Indonesian Government)

IO

International organisation

ISS

Integrated Support Service (UN)

JLOC

Joint Logistics Operations Centre (UN)

JMAC

Joint Mission Analysis Centre (UN)

JOC

Joint Operations Centre (UN)

MINUSTAH

UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti

MLT

Mission Leadership Team (UN)

MONUC

UN Mission in the DRC

MONUSCO

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in DRC (formerly MONUC)

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO

Non-Governmental Organisation

OCHA

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)

PNTL

Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste/National Police of Timor-Leste

PM&C

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Australian Government)

PRT

Provincial Reconstruction Team (Afghanistan)

RAMSI

Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands

SEA

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

SGTM

Standardized Generic Training Module

SML

Senior Mission Leadership (UN)

SOP

Standard Operating Procedure

START

Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force (Canadian Government)

SU

Stabilisation Unit (United Kingdom Government)

TAM

Technical Assessment Mission (UN)

TLPDT

Timor-Leste Police Development Program

UNAMID

AU/UN Hybrid mission in Darfur

UNCT

UN Country Team

UNMIT

United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste

UNTAET

United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

WFP

World Food Programme (UN)

1. ← The summary report from the first Civil-Military Interaction Seminar, held in Sydney in 2009, is available at http://civmilcoe.gov.au/resources/publications/civil-military-interaction-seminar-2009-seminar-summary/
2. ← This report draws upon the notes from Sarah Shteir and Paul Lushenko, CMIS co-rapporteurs, PowerPoint presentations shared by participants, and the working group discussion summary notes prepared by Centre staff. The views expressed in this report do not represent Australian Government policy.
3. ← According to one participant, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations had conducted 13 SML courses over the last four years, training 123 civilians, 111 military personnel and 89 police.
4. ← This document is accessible on the Challenges Forum website at http://challengesforum.org/cms/Considerations_Study_.do?pageId=219
5. ← This suggestion applies to disaster situations as well as conflict environments.
6. ← Issues related to disaster preparedness and response that were addressed on the first and second days of CMIS have been included in this section.